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Sarbanes-Oxley's Officer Certification Requirements-
Has Increased Accountability Equaled Increased Liability?
Erin Massey Everitt*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of countless corporate scandals, the demand for greater
executive accountability was at a fever pitch by 2001. Congress re-
sponded by including Sections 302 and 906 in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, which required more extensive certifications by corporate ex-
ecutives and heightened penalties for false certifications. Though di-
rectly responding to investor outcry, these provisions were met with as
much skepticism as they were applause.
Some critics were concerned the provisions were too far-reaching
and would essentially impose strict liability on officers-particularly
for those running large, multi-national corporations-when it was en-
tirely impractical to imagine an individual could verify the accuracy of
every detail of the financial reports.1 Others argued the proposed pro-
visions were largely a replica of rules already in place under the Ex-
change Act, which had already proven ineffective at preventing the
earlier corporate debacles, and merely gave the appearance of reform
without providing any real substantive change.2 Five years have now
passed since Sections 302 and 906's enactment, and the case law,
though limited, offers a telling glimpse of the true impact of these
provisions.
This Article surveys the liability associated with officer certifica-
tions under Sections 302 and 906. Specifically, this Article examines
whether the increased accountability demanded by Sections 302 and
906 has translated into increased liability for corporate executives.
This Part provides a brief background on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and,
* Erin Massey Everitt is an associate at White & Case, LLP in Washington, D.C., where she
engages in corporate defense litigation, focusing primarily on securities and antitrust litigation.
Mrs. Everitt received her J.D. from Southern Methodist University and her LL.M. in Securities
and Financial Regulation from Georgetown University Law Center. All commentary within this
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1. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Form over Substance?: Officer Certification and the Promise of En-
hanced Personal Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1-3 (2002).
2. Id. at 4.
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specifically, the impetus for Sections 302 and 906's officer certification
requirements. Part II examines the actual substance of the provisions
and guidance governing their immediate application. Part III surveys
judicial interpretation and application of Sections 302 and 906 and
identifies any significant trends or problems in uniformity. Part IV ex-
amines the role of these provisions in private litigation under the an-
tifraud provisions of the securities laws. This Article ultimately
concludes that, although the more extensive certification provisions
have indisputably increased executives' potential liability to civil and
criminal enforcement authorities, executives' liability in private ac-
tions has not proceeded in parallel fashion. This is a result of courts
adhering strictly to the heightened pleading requirements under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA").
II. THE HISTORY BEHIND EXECUTIVE OFFICER CERTIFICATIONS
A. The Impetus for Increased Accountability of Corporate Officers
Much like the impetus for the securities regulation after the 1920s
market collapse, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted after the over-
zealous and under-scrutinized market of the late-1990s imploded. In-
vestors sustained billions in losses as scandals broke on some of the
world's largest companies.3 As the details of the scandals came to
light, it became increasingly implausible for legislators, regulators, and
the public to imagine that the highest-ranking executives could have
been in the dark as to the matters occurring right under their noses.
The first, and most publicized, case involved Enron Corporation
("Enron"), the world's seventh largest corporation at the time.4 From
1997 to 2001, Enron used illegal accounting methods to disguise and
improperly record revenue "generated by phony, non-arm's-length
transactions with Enron-controlled entities" to ensure steady earnings
growth, "conceal its growing debt, [and] maintain its artificially high
stock prices and investment grade credit rating."' 5 With the help of its
auditor, Arthur Andersen, Enron executives illegally structured such
deals to conceal Enron's true financial condition. 6
In late 2001, Enron announced a $544 million loss in the third quar-
ter, an overstatement of earnings by $586 million, and that it would be
3. Ann C. Logue, Best Foot Forward: SOX and Financial Standards: Higher Ed Leaders Come
to Terms with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, U. Bus., July 1, 2007, at 76.
4. Scott Pelley, Enron's Ken Lay: I Was Fooled, CBS NEWS, Mar. 13, 2005, http://www.cbs
news.constories/2005/03/11/60minutes/main679706.shtml.
5. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 613 (S.D. Tex.
2002).
6. Id. at 613-14.
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restating profits for the four previous years.7 After Enron revealed the
massive accounting fraud, it immediately collapsed and was forced to
declare bankruptcy. 8 Remarkably, in the period leading up to the an-
nouncement and amidst market speculation, Enron's chairman and
CEO, Kenneth Lay, consistently claimed that the company had no ac-
counting problems and that it was strong. 9 Following Enron's collapse,
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
brought charges against Lay. 10 Lay sought to avoid all liability by
claiming he was unaware of the accounting improprieties and relied
on the counsel of others in the organization when he issued statements
on behalf of the company.11
On June 25, 2002, WorldCom admitted it had overstated its profits
by a staggering $3.8 billion,12 wiping out all profits from 2001 and re-
sulting in the arrests of several WorldCom executives. 13 Like Ken Lay,
WorldCom's CEO, Bernie Ebbers, who had resigned just two months
before the announcement, claimed he had no knowledge of the ac-
counting fraud and that he left the daily details of running the com-
pany to subordinates. 14
Finally, in 2002, Tyco International, Ltd. was forced to make a
$382.2 million pre-tax adjustment to its 2002 financial statements15
and another $1.1 billion in after-tax charges after "unearthing fresh
accounting problems. ' 16 One aspect of the suspect accounting in-
volved tens of millions of dollars in "loan forgiveness" to Tyco's CEO
Dennis Kozlowski. 17 In response to the charges, Kozlowski claimed he
had no knowledge of the accounting treatment given to the loans and
7. John Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Enron Posts Surprise 3rd-Quarter Loss After Invest-
ment, Asset Write-Downs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2001, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1003237924
744857040.html.
8. Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 637.
9. Carrie Johnson, Prosecutors to Seek Charges Against Lay: Enron's Former Chairman to
Face Indictment for Role in Promoting Stock Sale, WASH. POST, June 20, 2004, at A08.
10. Id.
11. Pelley, supra note 4.
12. Yuki Noguchi & Renae Merle, WorldCom Says Its Books Are Off By $3.8 Billion, U.S.
Criminal Probe Reported, WASH. POST, June 26, 2002, at Al.
13. Renae Merle, Sullivan Rose By The Numbers: Deals, Detail Pushed Career at WorldCom,
WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2002, at El (covering career of Scott Sullivan, former CFO of WorldCom).
14. Johnson, supra note 9.
15. Tyco Int'l Ltd., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 5 (Dec. 30, 2002), available at http://www.
secinfo.com/dsvrt.38Ys.htm.
16. Tyco Shareholders Allege $6 Billion Fraud, USA TODAY, June 6, 2003, available at http://
www.usatoday.com/money/industries/manufacturing/2003-06-06-tyco-shareholdersx.htm.
17. M. Maremont & L. Cohen, Tyco Spent Millions for Benefit of Kozlowski, Its Former CEO:
Company Secretly Forgave Loans, Financed Extravagant Lifestyle, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2002, at
Al.
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that he had merely instructed subordinates to address his outstanding
loans at the end of each year. 18
These events decimated investor faith in the "integrity of the
world's capital markets." 19 Much of the blame for "the roll call of cor-
porate failures"20 fell to corporate executives who either directly en-
gaged in the inappropriate activities or took a "head in the sand"
approach with management by remaining willfully blind to the con-
duct of subordinates. As a result, investors and markets demanded
accountability for the senior executives of publicly-traded companies.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act2l was intended to prevent such disasters in
the future by increasing corporate transparency, auditor and executive
accountability, and penalties for wrongdoing.
B. Perception of Officer Certification Provisions
Congress enacted Sections 30222 and 90623 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act specifically to address the outraged demand for the increased ac-
countability of corporate executives. Upon its enactment, President
Bush noted that Sections 302 and 906 would usher in a new era of
increased accountability:
My accountability plan ... requires CEOs to personally vouch for
their firm's annual financial statements. Currently, a CEO signs a
nominal certificate and does so merely on behalf of the company. In
the future, the signature of the CEO should also be his or her per-
sonal certification of the veracity and fairness of the financial
disclosures.
2 4
President Bush further noted that the law ushered in a "new ethic of
personal responsibility in the business community," where "[w]hen
you sign a statement, you're pledging your word, and you should stand
behind it. ' '25
The provisions were similarly lauded by other regulators and legis-
lative officials. Then-Chairman of the SEC, Harvey L. Pitt, called cer-
18. Id.
19. William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech at the London
School of Economics: U.S. Capital Markets in the Post-Sarbanes-Oxley World: Why Our Mar-
kets Should Matter to Foreign Issuers (Jan. 25, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/spch012505whd.htm).
20. 148 CoNo. REc. H5463, H5472 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).
21. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 302 (2006).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
24. Fairfax, supra note 1, at 15 (citing Pres. George W. Bush, Speech on Corporate Responsi-
bility (July 9, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.orglnewshour//bbbusiness/july-dec02/
bush_7-9.html)).
25. Id.
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tification "an unprecedented step" because it required CEOs and
CFOs to "swear that the numbers they've reported in their financial
reports are correct and that they've left nothing important out. ' 26
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Representative James
Sensebrenner, similarly supported officer certification because those
provisions "w[ould] make CEOs directly responsible for the integrity
of their company's financial statements .... *"27
The business and academic communities' reactions to the new pro-
visions were mixed.28 Many believed "CEO certification w[ould] un-
derscore that CEOs are responsible for the management of the
company and that they take responsibility for what happens in their
company. '2 9 Notwithstanding, others were skeptical of the decision to
increase executive accountability because of costs associated with cer-
tifications. For example, one commentator noted:
The most significant cost of [Sarbanes-Oxley], one occasionally
mentioned by others but not discussed in great detail, may be the
opportunity costs associated with CEO and CFO review in connec-
tion with the certification process. To the extent officers decide to
undertake substantial due diligence in connection with the process,
this is time taken away from running the business. Of course, there
may be business benefits that accompany a greater understanding of
26. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Publishes List of Companies Whose Of-
ficers Are Ordered to Certify Accuracy and Completeness of Recent Annual Reports (June 28,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-96.htm.
27. 148 CONG. REC. H4684, 4684-85 (daily ed. July 16, 2002) (statement of Rep. F. James
Sensebrenner, Jr.).
28. A law firm's commentary immediately following the Act stated:
Sentiments expressed about this legislation cover every color of the political spectrum.
Some say that it is a prime example of Congressional overreaction to admittedly egre-
gious corporate behavior, and that the wrongdoers (who could be dealt with under
existing criminal statutes) are just a few "bad apples." Others say that Congress still has
not gone far enough to address the root causes of the problem affecting corporate
America .... [A] close reading of Sarbanes-Oxley reflects a Congressional desire to
administer shock treatment to those with stewardship responsibility for America's pub-
licly traded companies.
Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: An Ambitious Congressional At-
tempt at Regulating the Behavior of Corporate America and Its Advisors, ABANET.ORG (Aug.
2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/rppt/publications/edirt/2002/sarbanes/fulgbright.pdf.
29. Anitha Reddy, Few Argue with Pitt's Proposal for CEO Accountability, WASH. POST., June
28, 2002; see also Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061-63 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that
a corporate official who signs a financial report with scienter makes a statement within the
meaning of § 10(b) and can be held liable for that statement); Sheehan v. Little Switzerland, Inc.,
136 F. Supp. 2d 301, 312-14 (D. Del. 2001) (finding that CEO and CFO who signed 10-K with
scienter could be held personally liable); SEC v. Enter. Solutions, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 561, 575-
76 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that a CEO could be personally liable for signing statement he knew
was misleading); SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505, 522-27 (D.N.J. 1999).
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the financial statements. Either way, this is a cost that is difficult to
assess with any accuracy, so it often gets ignored.
30
Others pointed out that corporate officers already faced liability for
signing company financial reports and the new provisions offered little
in the way of true, substantive reform.31 As one newspaper article re-
ported, some corporate officers referred to the enactment of the certi-
fication provisions as a "non-event," stating that "few executives feel
they're anymore on the hook than they already were."'32
III. SUBSTANCE OF SECTIONs 302 AND 906
A. Section 302
Section 302 directed the SEC to enact a new rule requiring officer
certification, which the SEC did through Exchange Act Rule 15d-14. 33
In substance, Section 302 requires certification addressing disclosure
controls and procedures and internal controls and procedures. Re-
garding disclosure controls and procedures, the CEO and CFO must
certify that they:
> are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure con-
trols and procedures;
> have designed the company's disclosure controls and proce-
dures, or caused the disclosure controls and procedures to be
designed under their supervision, to ensure that material infor-
mation about the company, including its consolidated subsidiar-
ies, is made known to them by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which the 10-Q or 10-K is being
prepared; and
> have evaluated the effectiveness of the company's disclosure
controls and presented in the 10-Q or 10-K their conclusions
about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and proce-
dures, as of the end of the period covered by the 10-Q or 10-K,
based on their evaluation.
34
30. J. Robert Brown, Criticizing the Critics: Sarbanes-Oxley and Quack Corporate Govern-
ance, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 309, 321 n.65 (2006).
31. Fairfax, supra note 1, at 4; see also In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235
F. Supp. 2d 549, 576 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (noting that the general signature requirement on a Form
10-K can give rise to § 10(b) liability). This case is important in that it notes the tone already in
place for officers given the authority to attest to the accuracy and veracity of corporate filings
filed with the SEC. There is a long history of case law noted establishing liability where the
corporate officer signs the 10-K.
32. Dawn Gilbertson, CEO Filing Deadline Nears: New Rules Force Execs to Certify Finances,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 4, 2002, at Dl.
33. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-14 (2007).
34. § 240.13a-14(a); § 229.601(b)(31).
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Regarding internal controls and procedures (amended in Section
302 upon publication of the final rules implementing Section 404), the
CEO and CFO must certify that they:
> are responsible for establishing and maintaining internal control
over financial reporting;
> have designed the company's internal control over financial re-
porting, or caused it to be designed under their supervision, to
provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of finan-
cial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for ex-
ternal purposes in accordance with GAAP; and
> have indicated in the certified filing whether or not any changes
in internal control over financial reporting occurred during the
most recent fiscal quarter that have materially affected, or are
reasonably likely to materially affect, the company's internal
control over financial reporting.35
The SEC defines "internal control over financial reporting" as a
process designed by or under the supervision of the CEO and CFO
and effectuated by the board of directors, management, and other
personnel.36 The CEO and CFO must certify that the internal controls
provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial re-
porting and the preparation of financial statements for external pur-
poses was made in accordance with the Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles ("GAAP"). 37 Internal control over financial re-
porting includes those policies and procedures that:
> pertain to the maintenance of records that in reasonable detail
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of
the assets of the company;
> provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as
necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in accor-
dance with GAAP, and that receipts and expenditures of the
issuer are being made only in accordance with authorizations of
the company's management and directors;38 and
> provide reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely
detection of unauthorized acquisition, use or disposition of the
company's assets that could have a material effect on the finan-
cial statements. 39
35. § 240.13a-15(a); § 240.13a-14(a); § 229.601(b)(31).
36. § 240.13a-15(f).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. § 240.13a-14(a).
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The SEC made clear that it intended Section 302 certifications to be
taken seriously by stating: "Your Section 302 certification specifically
speaks to your responsibility for disclosure controls and procedures
and to you, as CFO and a certifying officer, having evaluated those
and disclosed your conclusions about them in your company's public
filing - you cannot hide your head in the sand on this one.'40
Through this statement, the SEC firmly established that certifying of-
ficers would be held to a higher standard than they previously had
been and that, by certifying, the officers were expressly stating they
had faithfully met that heightened standard.
B. Section 906
In substance, Section 906 amended the U.S. Criminal Code by en-
acting 18 U.S.C. § 1350, which requires officer certification. Under
Section 906, a CEO and CFO must "certify that the periodic report
containing the financial statements fully complies with the require-
ments of section 13(a) or section 15(d) of the . . . Exchange Act" and
based on his or her knowledge, the financial statements and other fi-
nancial information included in the report "fairly presents, in all mate-
rial respects, the financial condition[,] and results of operations," and
cash flows of the registrant, as of, and for, the periods presented in the
report.41
The most attention-grabbing aspect of Section 906 was it explicitly
provided for criminal liability for failing to make such certification or
falsely certifying financial statements. Section 906 imposes two tiers of
criminal liability, depending on the mental state associated with the
violation. A person who knowingly violates the certification provision
faces a maximum penalty of one million dollars, a maximum prison
term of ten years, or both.42 In contrast, willful violations of the provi-
sion subject a person to a maximum five million dollar fine, a maxi-
mum prison term of twenty years, or both.43 The impact of the
enhanced criminal punishment is beyond question-Sarbanes-Oxley's
new penalties doubled the previous penalties for signing false reports
under the Exchange Act and is four times the maximum jail time for
defendants under the mail and wire fraud statutes.44
40. John W. White, Director, Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech by SEC
Staff: Executive Compensation Disclosure and the Important Role of CFOs (Oct. 3, 2006) (tran-
script available at http:lwww.sec.govlnewslspeech/2006/spchlO0306jww.htm).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006).
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Notably, in the five years since Section 906's enactment, little gui-
dance has emerged on the difference between "knowing" and "will-
ful." In answering questions before Congress, Senator Joseph Biden
attempted to explain the level of culpability required by the "know-
ing" standard by stating, while "those who act out of ignorance, mis-
take, accident or even sloppiness" would not be held criminally liable,
the statute nevertheless was intended to send a clear message to exec-
utives "to watch your books and not bury your heads in the sand!" 45
The first person to be criminally charged pursuant to Section 906
was the former CEO of HealthSouth Corporation, Richard Scrushy,
in October 2003. In seeking to dismiss the charges brought against him
under Section 906, Scrushy challenged the constitutionality of Section
906 by arguing that its provisions were impermissibly vague. 46 The
court rejected this argument following careful consideration of the
newly adopted language. In its closing, the court noted that determi-
nations of:
[F]airness, materiality, and willfulness are fact intensive questions
generally reserved for the jury.... If the jury finds that the reports
did not fairly present, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of HealthSouth, the jury must then deter-
mine whether Mr. Scrushy willfully certified these reports knowing
that the reports did not comport with the statute's accuracy
requirements.47
Surprisingly, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") has not actively
pursued charges under Section 906 since the Scrushy case. Even in the
recent stock-options backdating scandals, where DOJ has targeted
high-level corporate executives, not one individual has been indicted
under this provision. Indeed, in the most recent, high-profile criminal
trial of Brocade's CEO, Gregory Reyes, Reyes was indicted and con-
victed on a litany of charges, including allegations regarding false cer-
tifications, but none of the charges were brought under Section 906.48
Instead, the SEC brought a civil enforcement action against Reyes in
which the SEC included a charge under Section 302.49 Whether this
reflects a government reluctance to pursue criminal charges under
Section 906 is unclear, and the DOJ has issued no commentary to ex-
45. 148 CONG. REC. S7426 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Biden).
46. United States v. Scrushy, No. CR-03-BE-0530-S, 2004 WL 2713262, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Nov.
23, 2004).
47. Id. at *6 (emphasis in original).
48. See Indictment, United States v. Reyes (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2006) (No. 3:06-cr-00556-
CRB), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/canlcommunity/Notifications/documents/2007 06
12_reyes-jensen indictment.pdf.
49. See Complaint, SEC v. Reyes (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2005) (No. C-06-4435), available at http://
www.sec.gov/litigationlcomplaints/2006/comp19768.pdf.
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plain thus far. Notwithstanding, the force of Section 906 is clear, and
certifying officers must be mindful of the significant penalties imposed
for the intentional violation of the certification provisions.
C. Construing the "Fairly Present" Language in
Sections 302 and 906
Both Section 302 and 906 contain language wherein the officer must
certify that the financial statements filed with the SEC "fairly present"
the issuer's true financial condition, results of operations, and cash
flows. Given its inherently subjective nature, counsel and executives
of publicly traded companies immediately sought to clarify what
"fairly presents" meant in the certifications. Almost immediately, the
SEC specifically rejected suggestions that "fairly present" should
mean that the financial statements were GAAP compliant.50 Thus,
even where financial information is presented in conformity with gen-
erally accepted accounting principles, it may not necessarily satisfy ob-
ligations under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws.51
Instead, the SEC adopted a broader standard for satisfying the
"fairly presents" certification:
In our view, a 'fair presentation' of an issuer's financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows encompasses the selection of
appropriate accounting policies, proper application of appropriate
accounting policies, disclosure of financial information that is in-
formative and reasonably reflects the underlying transactions and
events and the inclusion of any additional disclosure necessary to
provide investors with a materially accurate and complete picture of
an issuer's financial condition, results of operations and cash
flows. 52
Thus, an officer may certify that financial statements "fairly present"
the company's true financial condition and cash flows when the officer
has weighed the appropriateness of utilized accounting policies and
whether the corporation properly applied those accounting policies.53
Additionally, an officer must consider whether the disclosure of finan-
50. See Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports,
67 Fed. Reg. 57,276, 57,279 n.55 (Aug. 29, 2002) ("Presenting financial information in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles may not necessarily satisfy obligations under the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws."); see also Letter from Linklaters to SEC
(Aug. 19, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/linklaters1.htm.
51. See United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969); see also Caterpillar, Inc., 50 S.E.C.
903 (1992); Edison Schools, Inc., 77 SEC Docket 1800 (May 14, 2002).
52. Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. at
57,279 n.54 (adopting release for certification rules).
53. See id.
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cial information is informative, whether it reasonably reflects the un-
derlying transactions and events, and whether any additional
disclosures are necessary to provide investors with a materially accu-
rate assessment of an issuer's financial picture.5 4
D. Which Filings Have Certification Requirements?
Only "periodic reports" must be certified pursuant to Sections 302
and 906.55 Because there are no timing requirements on when a Form
6-K or Form 8-K must be filed, thereby making them "current re-
ports" instead of "periodic reports," the SEC's certification require-
ments do not require CEOs and CFOs to certify either Forms 6-K or
8-K.56 In contrast, annual and quarterly reports filed or submitted
under either § 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act must be certified.
This includes annual reports on Form 10-K, 10-KSB, 20-F and 40-F,
quarterly reports on Form 10-Q and 10-QSB, as well as any amend-
ments to these filings. Sections 302 and 906 were significant in that
those provisions extended officer certification to quarterly filings (10-
Q, 10-QSB), which were not previously required.
IV. LIABILITY UNDER SECTIONS 302 & 906: How THE
CASE LAW HAS DEVELOPED
Since their enactment, judicial interpretation and application of
Sections 302 and 906 has been largely reasoned and, fortunately, with
little inconsistency emerging within and among the circuits on impor-
tant issues.
A. No Private Right of Action for Sections 302 & 906
Most fundamentally, in 2006, two courts found Sections 302 and 906
do not create a private right of action for individuals. In Srebnik v.
Dean, plaintiffs argued that a private right of action should exist be-
cause Congress did not specifically prohibit private rights of action
under Sections 302 and 906.57 Plaintiffs also argued that allowing a
private right of action was consistent with precedent cases that found
private rights of action under other sections of the Exchange Act.58
The court rejected plaintiffs' argument, finding there was no "rights
creating" language, such as that employed by Congress in Section 306,
54. See id.
55. See id. at 57,278.
56. See id.
57. Srebnik v. Dean, No. 05-cv-01086, 2006 WL 2790408, at *5 (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2006).
58. Id. (noting that the plaintiffs did not cite to any court recognizing a private right of action
and stating that it was not aware of any).
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to support the argument that Congress intended to omit a right of ac-
tion.59 The District Court of New Jersey arrived at the same holding in
In re Intelligroup Securities Litigation and likewise cited to the lan-
guage of Section 306 as the basis of its reading. 60 These rulings appear
to be settled law, as subsequent private plaintiffs have not attempted
to bring direct claims under Sections 302 and 906.
B. Qualified Certifications Will Not Evade Liability
The only court to address certifications where the officer qualifies
his certification upon some other event or condition found such quali-
fication could not be used to evade liability. 61 The court noted
"[d]oubletalk stating that controls were 'effective' subject to a discus-
sion of internal weaknesses that was itself knowingly or recklessly
false or misleading bespeaks more of conscious evasion of the truth
rather than candor. '62 Significantly, the court found the use of qualify-
ing language to be an indication of culpability, rather than a protec-
tion against it.
Without further adjudication of this issue, it is too early to deter-
mine whether other courts will agree that qualified certifications can-
not be used to evade liability. Nevertheless, any argument that a
qualified certification offers protection from the penalties or responsi-
bilities of Sections 302 or 906 should fail. To hold otherwise would
allow publicly traded companies to issue their quarterly or annual re-
ports without necessarily accurate financial statements so long as the
certifying officer selected the correct qualification. Qualified certifica-
tions would thereby undermine the legislature's intent in passing Sec-
tions 302 and 90663 and diminish regulators' ability to hold officers to
a higher degree of accountability for their certifications.
V. LIABILITY UNDER THE ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS FOR
SECrION 302 & 906 VIOLATIONS
Perhaps the most interesting development stemming from the im-
plementation of officer certification requirements is the more signifi-
cant role the Sarbanes-Oxley certifications are playing in allegations
59. Id.
60. In re Intelligroup Sec. Litig., 468 F. Supp. 2d 679, 707 (D.N.J. 2006).
61. In re OCA, Inc. Sec. & Derivative Litig., No. 05-2165, 2006 WL 3747560, at *22 (E.D. La.
Dec. 14, 2006) (rejecting defendants' argument that their certifications were qualified, in that
their certifications were subject to OCA's internal controls weaknesses, as exceptions to
liability).
62. Id.
63. Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. at
57,279.
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involving other provisions of the securities laws. Most notably, Section
302 and 906 certifications are frequently mentioned in cases brought
by private plaintiffs under the antifraud provisions of the Exchange
Act (e.g., Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and Rule 20(a)). Although officer
certifications were often cited in cases prior to the enactment of
Sarbanes-Oxley, the public policy statements and the heightened re-
sponsibilities and expectations associated with the new provisions
have given plaintiffs enhanced ammunition with which to attack certi-
fying officers.
As a public policy matter, the judiciary and enforcement authorities
approve of such overlap in liability. As Justice Ginsberg noted in a
recent opinion: "This Court has long recognized that meritorious pri-
vate actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essen-
tial supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions
brought, respectively, by the Department of Justice and the Securities
and Exchange Commission. ' 64 Consequently, executives must be
mindful that liability from Section 302 and 906 certifications can al-
ways extend beyond the actual provisions.
A. The Role of Section 302 & 906 Certifications Section
10(b)/Rule lob-5 Claims
Officer certifications have long played a role in claims alleging
fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. As a result of the more
extensive certification provisions implemented through Sections 302
and 906, however, the question arises whether the increased accounta-
bility imposed by these provisions exposes corporate executives to
greater liability under the antifraud provisions. Arguably, corporate
executives' exposure has increased on two grounds: 1) some courts
allow the officer certifications filed with SEC filings to constitute a
"false or misleading statement" for purposes of establishing liability
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and 2) plaintiffs argue that the
enhanced accountability imposed by the provisions weighs more heav-
ily in the scienter assessment than previous officer certifications.
1. Certifications as "False or Misleading Statements"
Numerous courts have been asked to decide whether an officer's
certification can serve as a "false or misleading statement" for pur-
poses of asserting a claim under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.
While some courts recognize signed certifications as "statements"
64. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504 (2007).
238 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
under Section 10(b), 65 others reject the idea that Sarbanes-Oxley cer-
tifications standing alone may provide a basis for liability.66 Given
these disparate conclusions, it will be necessary going forward for
courts to uniformly decide whether officer certification statements
may constitute "false and misleading statements" to avoid plaintiff fo-
rum-shopping.
The latter approach, however, may be the most appropriate for sev-
eral reasons. First and foremost, legislative history and statutory lan-
guage do not authorize plaintiffs to base fraud claims on the Sarbanes-
Oxley officer certifications. 67 As the district court for the Northern
District of California noted in In re Silicone Technologies, Inc.:
Moreover, with regard to both the statement regarding inventory
valuations and the statement regarding compliance with GAAP, the
court notes that there is nothing in either the 1934 Securities Ex-
change Act or the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and implementing regula-
tions that authorizes plaintiffs to base a claim for securities fraud on
an alleged misstatement in a Sarbanes-Oxley certification. 68
Moreover, there is a logical gap in allowing stand-alone liability for
Sarbanes-Oxley certifications under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 when
Congress did not create a private right of action under Sections 302
and 906. Congress's explicit decision to exclude rights creating lan-
guage in 302 and 906 for private plaintiffs is therefore evidence that
Sarbanes-Oxley certifications were not meant to provide a basis for
liability to private plaintiffs.
Finally, as explained below, courts are able to balance this more
restricted approach by allowing the officer certifications to be consid-
ered for the far more difficult and critical component that plaintiffs
sufficiently allege cogent, plausible facts that give rise to a strong in-
65. See Wieland v. Stone Energy Corp., No. 05-2088, 2007 WL 2903178, at *7-8 (W.D. La.
Aug. 17, 2007); Energytek, Inc. v. Proctor, 516 F. Supp. 2d 660, 672-73 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (finding
misstatements in SEC filings by certifying officer an actionable basis for a § 10(b) claim); Li-
mantour v. Cray Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1159-1161 (W.D. Wash. 2006); In re Ramp Corp. Sec.
Litig., No. 05 Civ. 6521, 2006 WL 2037913, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2006) (finding that a § 302
certification could serve as a misstatement for a § 10(b) violation against an individual
defendant).
66. See, e.g., In re Watchguard Sec. Litig., No. C05-678J, 2006 WL 2038656, at *10-12 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 21, 2006) (stating that a certification cannot be the basis of a Rule lOb-5 claim).
67. See Srebnik v. Dean, No. 05-cv-01086, 2006 WL 2790408, at *5 (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2006)
(noting that the plaintiffs did not cite to any court recognizing a private right of action and
stating that it was not aware of any); In re Intelligroup Sec. Litig., 468 F. Supp. 2d 679, 707
(D.N.J. 2006) (finding no private right of action under the Sarbanes-Oxley certification provi-
sions based on Congress's explicit use of rights creating language in 15 U.S.C. § 7244).
68. In re Silicone Storage Tech., Inc., No. C-05-0295 PJH, 2007 WL 760535, at *17 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 9, 2007).
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ference of scienter. 69 In short, by restricting certifications from consti-
tuting "false and misleading statements" under the antifraud
provisions, courts recognize congressional intent and history without
depriving plaintiffs entirely of utilizing the certification statements in
their pleadings. This is a balanced and appropriate approach under
the Exchange Act and Sarbanes-Oxley.
2. Certifications Supporting an Inference of Scienter
Since Sarbanes-Oxley's enactment, a clear majority of the courts al-
low Sections 302 and 906 certifications to be considered as evidence
that a defendant acted with the requisite "scienter" under the an-
tifraud provisions. 70 As one district court noted:
[C]ommentators argue that when a corporate officer certifies a com-
pany's financial reports, the company's later revelation that the re-
ports contained material false statements can support an inference
that the officer either knew or was reckless about the false state-
ments, by virtue of the company's disclosure controls, or that he
knew or was reckless in not knowing that the company's disclosure
controls were inadequate. Either of these inferences can help a
plaintiff establish scienter.71
As expected, plaintiffs immediately jumped on the enhanced account-
ability aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley officer certification provisions to
satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of the antifraud provi-
sions under the PSLRA.72 For instance, in In re OCA, Inc. Securities
and Derivative Litigation, the plaintiffs argued:
The Sarbanes-Oxley certification requirements were expressly in-
tended to prevent top executives from using a "head in the sand"
defense to actions for securities fraud committed on their watch.
Indeed, the SEC has warned that corporate officers that provided a
"false certification potentially could be subject to ... both Conimis-
69. See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2509.
70. See Wieland v. Stone Energy Corp., No. 05-2088, 2007 WL 2903178, at *7 (W.D. La. Aug.
17, 2007); In re Silicone Storage Tech., Inc., No. C-05-0295 PJH, 2007 WL 760535, at *17 (N.D.
Cal. March 9, 2007); In re Intelligroup Sec. Litig., 468 F. Supp. 2d 670, 707 (D.N.J. 2006); In re
OCA, Inc. Sec. & Derivative Litig., No. 05-2165, 2006 WL 3747560, at *22 (E.D. La. Dec. 14,
2006) (indicating that false certifications under Sections 302 or 906 may provide a basis for an
inference of scienter); In re Hypercom Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV-05-0455, 2006 WL 1836181, at
*11 (D. Ariz. July 5, 2006) (citing In re Invision Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C04-03181, 2006 WL
538752, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2006) (declining to find that the plaintiff had adequately
pleaded scienter by showing a misstatement in a Sarbanes-Oxley certification)) (finding that
false certification could be used as circumstantial evidence, combined with other allegations of
scienter, to establish that a defendant acted with scienter); In re Lattice Semiconductor Corp.
Sec. Litig., No. CV04-1255-AA, 2006 WL 538756, at *17-18 (D. Or. Jan. 3, 2006).
71. OCA, 2006 WL 3747560, at *21.
72. See, e.g., Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2509 (articulating the standard for pleading a "strong infer-
ence" under section 10(b)).
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sion and private actions for violation of Section 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. ' '73
Similarly, in In re Watchguard Securities Litigation, plaintiffs directly
attacked individual certifying officers for allegedly failing to meet
Sarbanes-Oxley's heightened obligations:
Section 302's certification requirements were expressly designed to
counter arguments that Sarbanes-Oxley certifications do not sup-
port an inference of scienter by preventing top executives from
adopting a "head in the sand" defense to actions for securities fraud
committed on their watch. The SEC recognized as much in imple-
menting § 302, by expressly warning corporate officers that "a false
certification potentially could be subject to . . . both Commission
and private actions for violations of Section 10(b) and of the Ex-
change Act and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. 7 4
The same arguments were seen in In re Intelligroup, Inc. Securities
Litigation, where plaintiffs referred the court to the legislative com-
mentary highlighting the enhanced accountability associated with the
new certification provisions:
[Section 302] simply seeks to facilitate full disclosure and ensure the
accuracy of financial reports by requiring corporate executives' per-
sonal stamp of approval. As Secretary Miller stated plainly but
poignantly, "if the CEO is required to certify the reports he will be
hard pressed later to say he thought that the CFO had everything in
apple pie shape. So the certificate becomes the hook that establishes
accountability. 75
In seeking to use Section 302 certifications to demonstrate the requi-
site culpable state of mind, the plaintiffs in Intelligroup went further
by distinguishing Section 302 certifications from the pre-Sarbanes-
Oxley boilerplate language often unsuccessfully cited by earlier plain-
tiffs as proof of scienter. In Intelligroup, the plaintiffs argued:
Defendants did not merely sign SEC filings containing "boilerplate"
- they certified the Company's financials with personal endorse-
ments of the design and evaluation of Intelligroup's internal con-
trols, the material weakness or non-existence of which directly
caused material misstatements and ultimately necessitated the Com-
pany's restatement .... [F]or the foregoing reasons, the Sarbanes-
73. Lead Plaintiff's Consolidated Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Class
Action Complaint, In re OCA, Inc. Sec. & Derivative Litig., No. 05-2165 (E.D. La. Apr. 3, 2006).
74. Class Action Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Consolidated Class
Action Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws, In re Watchguard Sec. Litig., No.
2:05-cv-00678 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 13, 2006).
75. Lead Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motions to Dismiss and in Partial
Opposition to Request for Judicial Notice, In re Intelligroup, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 04-4980, 2006
WL 1882544 (D.N.J. May 11, 2006) (emphasis in original).
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Oxley certifications in this case strongly suggest the Individual De-
fendants' scienter. 76
One of the first court decisions to consider the interplay of
Sarbanes-Oxley certifications and alleging scienter, In re Lattice Semi-
conductor, indicated that plaintiffs' arguments were well-received. In
that case, the district court found:
Sarbanes-Oxley certifications give rise to an inference of scienter be-
cause they provide evidence either that defendants knew about the
improper [accounting] that led to the over-reporting of revenues
(because of the internal controls they said existed) or, alternatively,
knew that the controls they attested to were inadequate. 77
Subsequently, in SEC v. Penthouse International, Inc., the district
court also found that Sarbanes-Oxley certifications were materially
misleading in their own right and contributed to a strong inference of
scienter.78
Notwithstanding these initial rulings, Sarbanes-Oxley officer certifi-
cations do not provide plaintiffs with a "home-run" allegation of sci-
enter. Courts have been absolutely rigid in holding that "an incorrect
Sarbanes-Oxley certification does not, by itself, create a strong infer-
ence of scienter. ' 79 Since Lattice Semiconductors, most courts have
analyzed the certification obligations under a more critical approach,
requiring plaintiffs to show a connection between the wrongdoing and
the certifying officers before holding those officers accountable. Thus,
in WatchGuard, the court distinguished Lattice Semiconductors,
noting:
In a case like this one, however, where the court finds no strong
inference that any Defendant was at least deliberately reckless in
issuing corporate earnings statements, the court has no basis for a
strong inference that the Sarbanes-Oxley certifications are culpably
false.... Plaintiffs in this matter have not pleaded any connection
between WatchGuard's accounting inadequacies and the Defend-
ants. These Plaintiffs have alleged merely that because WatchGuard
was a small company, the Defendants must have known about the
improprieties. The court has already found this allegation insuffi-
cient to support a strong inference of scienter.80
76. Id.
77. In re Lattice Semiconductor Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV04-1255-AA, 2006 WL 538756, at
*18 (D. Or. Jan. 3, 2006).
78. SEC v. Penthouse Int'l, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 2d 344, 354-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
79. See In re Hypercom Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV-05-0455, 2006 WL 1836181, at *11 (D. Ariz.
July 5, 2006) (citing In re Invision Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 04-03181, 2006 WL 538752, at *21
(N.D. Cal. 2006)).
80. In re Watchguard Sec. Litig., No. C05-678J, 2006 WL 2038656, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Apr.
21, 2006) (distinguishing Lattice Semiconductors) (citations omitted).
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Where the plaintiff can plead other facts in addition to the officer cer-
tifications, however, courts have given weight to the obligations inher-
ent in the certification statements:
The Court does not hold that a Sarbanes-Oxley certification, with-
out more, would support a strong inference of scienter under the
PSLRA. However, under the particular facts of this case, the Court
does find that the Sarbanes-Oxley certifications executed by [the
defendants], when combined with the allegations of scienter con-
tained in the previous sections, support an inference of scienter as
to the defendants' statements about OCA's disclosure controls be-
cause the certifications show that both defendants stated that they
designed and evaluated OCA's control procedures to ensure that
they worked to provide them with material information about the
company and then certified that the controls were effective, while at
the same time failing to disclose serious, unremedied internal con-
trol problems.81
Likewise, in Watchguard, the district court noted:
The court finds that, in this case, Defendants' Sarbanes-Oxley certi-
fications are inadequate to support a strong inference of scienter.
Plaintiffs contend that Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to
prevent certifying corporate officers from invoking a "head-in-the-
sand" defense to 10b-5 allegations. Accepting Plaintiffs' view of
congressional intent for the present, the court nonetheless finds that
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not doom these Defendants. Although
the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley may make it somewhat more reason-
able to infer that a certifying Defendant whose head is in the sand is
being deliberately reckless, it does not transform the PSLRA's re-
quirement of falsity-plus-scienter into a requirement of falsity-plus-
a-Sarbanes-Oxley-certification. 82
Similarly, in In re Invision Technologies, Inc. Securities Litigation, the
court held that despite plaintiffs' claims "alleging the falsity of De-
fendants' Certification statement, . .. [t]here [we]re insufficient facts
alleged to infer that [Defendants] had any knowledge of the alleged
FCPA violations in light of the PSLRA's heightened scienter require-
ments. '8 3 The Eleventh Circuit specifically affirmed this approach in
Garfield v. NDC Health Corp.84 In Garfield, the Eleventh Circuit held
that the plain meaning of the language contained in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act did not indicate any intention to change the requirements
for pleading scienter set forth in the PSLRA. 85
81. In re OCA, Inc. Sec. & Derivative Litig., No. 05-2165, 2006 WL 3747560, at *22 (E.D. La.
Dec. 14, 2006).
82. Watchguard, 2006 WL 2038656, at *11.
83. Invision, 2006 WL 538752, at *6-7.
84. Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006).
85. Id.
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Such flexibility in deciding whether plaintiffs have satisfied their sci-
enter requirements via false certification allegations is critical to al-
lowing courts the means to properly apply the antifraud provisions
against defendants.8 6 Further, the majority approach is consistent with
the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, in which the Court held scienter analysis should not turn on a
single factor, but should require "a comparative evaluation" of the
facts.87 Thus, the fact that an officer certified a company's SEC filing
will qualify as a "strong" inference of scienter "only if a reasonable
person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as
compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts
alleged. 88
Thus, despite Congress's intention to enhance CEO and CFO ac-
countability with Sections 302 and 906, it is abundantly clear that
plaintiffs must have more in their pleading arsenal than simply
Sarbanes-Oxley certifications by corporate executives. Plaintiffs must
still be able to plead facts sufficient to raise a strong inference of sci-
enter for each individual defendant with respect to the wrongdoing
accused. Imposing the burden on plaintiffs is not only preferred, but
necessary to avoid having officer certification create strict liability.
Moreover, to limit allegations of false certifications as circumstantial,
rather than dispositive, evidence to establish scienter is consistent with
the congressional intent behind the heightened pleading requirements
imposed by the PSLRA and the Supreme Court's ruling in Tellabs.
B. The Role of Sections 302 & 906 Certification
in Section 20(a) Claims
False officer certifications are also frequently alleged in control-per-
son liability claims under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act of 1934.
In pertinent part, Section 20(a) states:
86. See Wieland v. Stone Energy Corp., No. 05-2088, 2007 WL 2903178 (W.D. La. Aug. 17,
2007).
87. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504 (2007).
88. Id. at 2510; see also In re ProQuest Sec. Litig., No. 06-10619, 2007 WL 3275109, at *15
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 6, 2007) (order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss). In ProQuest, the court
found that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged scienter, even in light of Tellabs, by alleging other
evidence of scienter, such as the size of the restatement, the timing of share sales by the certify-
ing executive, and statements by confidential informants. Id. However, the court specifically
noted that "the most significant evidence of scienter" was from the "SOX certifications." Id. The
court noted that the executives "cannot say that the SOX certifications concerning knowledge of
and adequacy of internal controls were truthful, yet, at the same time claim that the controls
were so deficient that one 'rogue' employee could single-handedly be the cause of all the com-
pany's accounting problems." Id. at *27.
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Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable
under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation
thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the
same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such
controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in
good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts
constituting the violation of cause of action.89
The debate over this provision revolves around the meaning of "con-
trol." 90 The SEC defined "control" as "the possession, direct or indi-
rect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management
and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting se-
curities, by contract, or otherwise," 91 although not all courts have
adopted this definition.
Plaintiffs argue it is axiomatic that where an officer may face crimi-
nal liability for certifying financial statements, the officer is in a posi-
tion to exert "control" over the alleged primary violator because that
officer may otherwise refuse to certify.92 Notably, courts seem willing
to allow plaintiffs to enjoy an inference of control against officers who
signed the SEC filings, at least at the initial pleading stage:
[Ain allegation that a board member signed an SEC filing that con-
tains a misleading or fraudulent statement can raise a sufficient in-
ference of control because it comports 'with common sense to
presume that a person who signs his name to a report has some
measure of control over those who write the report.'93
Pre-Sarbanes-Oxley plaintiffs were able to cite to officer certifications
of a company's financial statements as evidence of an individual's
"control" over a primary violator.94 The rhetoric behind Sections 302
and 906's enactment, however, lends greater weight to such allega-
tions because of the enhanced responsibilities imposed on officers and
89. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006).
90. See generally Erin L. Massey, Control Person Liability Under Section 20(a): Striking a
Balance of Interests for Plaintiffs and Defendants, 6 Hous. Bus. & TAX L. J. 109 (2006).
91. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2007) (definition issued for the purposes of administrative
proceedings).
92. See New Jersey v. Sprint Corp., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1144-45 (D. Kan. 2004) (holding that
at the pleading stage, plaintiffs enjoyed an inference of control against directors who signed the
SEC filings) (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 1144.
94. See Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000); In re Indep. Energy
Holdings PLC, 154 F. Supp. 2d 741, 772 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); In re Philip Servs. Corp. Sec. Litig., No.
98 Civ. 0835 (MBM), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9261, at *62 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2004) ("While there
is case law suggesting that a defendant's execution of a fraudulent SEC filing is insufficient by
itself to establish control, [the court] share[s] the view that it 'comports with common sense to
presume that a person who signs his name to a report has some measure of control over those
who write the report."') (internal citations omitted); Jacobs v. Coopers & Lybrand, L.L.P., No.
97 CIV. 3374, 1999 WL 101772, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1999) (alleging outside directors signed
fraudulent report sufficient to meet pleading standard for § 20(a)).
[Vol. 6:225
2008] INCREASED ACCOUNTABILITY EQUALED INCREASED LIABILITY? 245
their exposure to criminal liability for willfully or knowingly certifying
false statements. 95
Beyond acknowledging that Sections 302 and 906 certifications may
provide a basis for alleging "control person" status, one cannot gener-
alize the true impact of officer certifications under Sections 302 and
906 because different jurisdictions apply different tests in determining
"control." Stated another way, the likely success or failure of a plain-
tiff's claim is entirely dependent upon the test of control that a juris-
diction applies. For instance, where the plaintiff need only show
potential or actual control to establish liability under Section 20(a), it
will be harder for a certifying officer to argue lack of knowledge or
control given the enhanced expectations associated with the certifica-
tion provisions. 96 In contrast, where the court requires the culpable
participation of the control person in the fraudulent transaction, the
officer's culpability will be dispositive of liability, and officer certifica-
tions will play little to no role in the "control" assessment. Conse-
quently, a uniform control-person test under Section 20(a) is
necessary to avoid having certifying defendants subject to different
outcomes as a result of the jurisdiction in which the plaintiff brings
suit.
VI. CONCLUSION
The officer certification requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
have proven quite effective at prompting executives of publicly traded
companies to become more engaged in the financial reporting pro-
cess.9 7 Two aspects of the officer certification provisions have been
critical to the enhancement of executive accountability. First, certify-
ing officers are now answerable to criminal authorities with the addi-
tion of criminal penalties pursuant to Section 906, which provides a
substantial deterrent effect. Second, officer certifications under Sec-
95. See In re OCA, Inc. Sec. & Derivative Litig., 2006 WL 3747560, at *23 (E.D. La. Dec. 14,
2006) (allowing plaintiff to proceed on certain Section 20(a) claims where control was estab-
lished, in part, because of the defendants' certification of company's SEC filings).
96. See Brown v. Enstar Group, Inc., 84 F.3d 393, 397 n.6 (11th Cir. 1996); Donohoe v. Con-
sol. Operating & Prod. Corp., 982 F.2d 1130, 1139 n.7 (7th Cir. 1992) (establishing potential
control test); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 630-31 (8th Cir. 1985) (establishing potential con-
trol test); Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Dynegy, Inc., 339 F. Supp.
2d 804, 828 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (requiring actual control to establish liability under Section 20(a)).
97. U.S. Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, No. GAO-06-678, UPDATE OF PUBLIC COMPANY
TRENDS, MARKET IMPACTS, AND REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES (2006) ("Some in-
dustry observers noted that several factors may have prompted more U.S. publicly traded com-
panies to restate previously reported financial results, including (1) the financial reporting
requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, especially the certification of financial reports required
by Section 302 .... ").
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tions 302 and 906 are playing an increasingly visible role in private
securities litigation brought under the Exchange Act's antifraud
provisions.
Notably, however, increased executive accountability for SEC fil-
ings has not equally translated into increased liability to private plain-
tiffs. By consistently employing critical, fact-specific analyses to
plaintiffs' pleading allegations involving officer certifications, the
courts uphold and reinforce the heightened pleading requirements of
the PSLRA 98 without allowing the certifications to impose strict liabil-
ity. It is therefore clear that both the doomsdayers and the naysayers
were wrong about Sections 302 and 906. Plaintiffs are better equipped
to plead officer accountability under the new Sarbanes-Oxley provi-
sions, but Sections 302 and 906 are by no means a free ticket to the
imposition of liability. As a result, the law has developed in a manner
consistent with Congress's ambition to increase officer accountability
without running afoul of other congressional mandates to limit frivo-
lous private litigation, thereby striking an impressive balance of sub-
stantive reform without undue burden on corporate officers.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).
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